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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Candace Moyer brought a putative class action against 
Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C. under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) after Patenaude sent her a collection 
letter inviting her to “eliminate further collection action” by 




Patenaude (1) deceives debtors by making them think a phone 
call is a “legally effective” means of ceasing collection activ-
ity, and (2)  makes debtors uncertain about their right to dispute 
a debt in writing. Moyer’s claims fail, so we will affirm the 





 Moyer failed to pay her credit-card debt, so the card 
issuer hired Patenaude to collect it. Patenaude sent Moyer a 
one-page, single-sided collection letter that stated the follow-
ing: 
 
Please be advised that the above-referenced debt 
has been assigned to this firm to initiate collec-
tion efforts regarding your delinquent outstand-
ing balance to our client. If you wish to eliminate 
further collection action, please contact us at 
800-832-7675 ext. 8500. 
 
Unless you notify this office within THIRTY 
(30) days of receiving this notice that you dispute 
the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, 
this office will assume this debt is valid. 
 
If you notify this office in writing within 
THIRTY (30) days of receiving this notice that 
this debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, this 
office will obtain verification of the debt, or a 
copy of a judgment against you, and mail you a 
copy of such verification or judgment. Further, if 




within THIRTY (30) days of receiving this 
notice, this office will provide you with the name 
and address of the original creditor, if different 
from the current creditor. 
 
This is an attempt to collect a debt and any infor-




 Moyer sued Patenaude for violating the FDCPA. Ac-
cording to Moyer, the letter’s second sentence—“[i]f you wish 
to eliminate further collection action, please contact us at 800-
832-7675 ext. 8500” (the “Contact Sentence”)—would deceive 
a debtor. Moyer argues that the Contact Sentence would lead a 
debtor to believe that a phone call is a “legally effective way to 
stop such collection action” when, in reality, only written com-
munication can legally stop collection activity. Appellant’s Br. 
13. In addition, Moyer claimed that the Contact Sentence 
would make a debtor uncertain about her right to dispute the 
debt in writing. 
 
 The District Court disagreed with Moyer and granted 





 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo and apply the same standard employed 




Custom Chem., LLC, 906 F.3d 85, 91 n.7 (3d Cir. 2018). Sum-
mary judgment is appropriate only if, after drawing all reason-
able inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there exists 
“no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the movant “is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shuker v. Smith & 
Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 770 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 
 
 Whether Patenaude’s collection letter violates the 
FDCPA is a question of law. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 




 “Congress enacted the FDCPA ‘to eliminate abusive 
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those 
debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection 
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote 
consistent State action to protect consumers against debt col-
lection abuses.’” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 358 (2019) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). “The FDCPA pursues these 
stated purposes by imposing affirmative requirements on debt 
collectors and prohibiting a range of debt-collection practices.” 
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b–1692j). The law authorizes pri-
vate civil actions against debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). 
 
 “To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove 
that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, 
(3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to 
collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has 
violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the 
debt.” Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 417 (3d 




Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2014)). The parties dispute only the fourth element—
whether Patenaude’s collection letter violated a provision of 
the FDCPA. 
 
 When deciding if a debt-collection action violates the 
FDCPA, we employ the “least sophisticated debtor” standard. 
Id. at 418. “The standard is an objective one, meaning that the 
specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually confused 
or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated debtor 
would be.” Id. at 419. This standard “protects naive consumers, 
[but] also ‘prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic inter-
pretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient of rea-
sonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and 
willingness to read with care.’” Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354–55 
(quoting United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 
136 (4th Cir. 1996)). Moyer relies on two provisions of the 
FDCPA in her suit against Patenaude.  
 
First, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, “[a] debt collector may 
not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 
means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Section 
1692e specifies several types of forbidden false communica-
tions and includes a catch-all provision that forbids “[t]he use 
of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or 
attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning 
a consumer.” Id. § 1692e(10). “[A] collection letter ‘is decep-
tive when it can be reasonably read to have two or more differ-
ent meanings, one of which is inaccurate.’” Wilson, 225 F.3d 
at 354 (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d 





 Second, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, a debt collector must 
provide the consumer with a written notice containing the fol-
lowing:  
 
(1) the amount of the debt; 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is 
owed; 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within 
thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the 
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the 
debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt col-
lector; 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the 
debt collector in writing within the thirty-day 
period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is dis-
puted, the debt collector will obtain verification 
of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the 
consumer and a copy of such verification or 
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the 
debt collector; and 
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written 
request within the thirty-day period, the debt col-
lector will provide the consumer with the name 
and address of the original creditor, if different 
from the current creditor. 
 
Id. § 1692g(a). “Paragraphs 3 through 5 of section 1692g(a) 
contain the validation notice [the “Validation Notice”]—the 
statements that inform the consumer how to obtain verification 
of the debt and that [s]he has thirty days in which to do so.” 
Wilson, 225 F.3d at 353–54 (second alteration in original). As 
shown above, Patenaude provided the Validation Notice in the 





 If a consumer follows § 1692g(a)(4) or (5) by writing to 
the debt collector to dispute the debt or to request the name of 
the original creditor, then § 1692g requires the debt collector 
to “cease collection of the debt . . . until the debt collector 
obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the 
name and address of the original creditor, and [these materials 
are] mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” Id. 
§ 1692g(b). “Any collection activities and communication dur-
ing the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent 
with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt 
or request the name and address of the original creditor.” Id. A 
debt collector violates this provision if the contents of the letter 
cause the least sophisticated debtor to be “confused or mislead” 
as to her “rights to dispute or seek validation of the debt.” 




 Moyer first contends that the letter is a deceptive means 
of debt collection in violation of § 1692e(10) because 
Patenaude indicated that a phone call was a “legally effective” 
means of stopping collection activity. Appellant’s Br. 13. Sec-
tion 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to “cease all collection 
efforts if the consumer provides written notice” that she dis-
putes the debt. Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354. A phone call from a 
debtor would not legally require Patenaude to cease collection 
efforts. But, according to Moyer, Patenaude’s invitation to 
“eliminate” collection action through a phone call would 
deceive a debtor into believing that the call would, by law, 





 Moyer’s argument fails because Patenaude never 
claimed the phone call was a “legally effective” means of stop-
ping collection efforts. Patenaude invited Moyer to call to 
“eliminate” collection action, but never asserted, explicitly or 
implicitly, that the phone call would, by law, force Patenaude 
to cease its collection efforts. Moyer reads into the invitation 
an implication that it does not create. For this reason, the dis-
trict court decisions cited by Moyer are inapposite. They each 
involve a debt collector who did state that a phone call would 
legally require collection activity to cease. See, e.g., Langley v. 
Weinstein & Riley, P.S., No. H-12-1562, 2013 WL 2951057, at 
*5, 7–8 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2013) (holding that a debtor col-
lector’s letter was deceptive when the letter stated that “the law 
requires [the debt collector] to suspend its [collection] efforts” 




 Moyer next contends that Patenaude’s insertion of the 
invitation to call in the Contact Sentence before the Validation 
Notice causes confusion regarding how to pursue her rights 
contained in the Validation Notice. According to Moyer, when 
an invitation to call appears directly before an acknowledg-
ment that the debtor can write to exercise her rights under 
§ 1692g, the debtor would be left uncertain about whether she 
should call or write to exercise her rights.  
 
 Moyer sees confusion where none exists. The Valida-
tion Notice instructs the debtor to write to exercise their 
§ 1692g rights, leaving no suggestions that a phone call would 
suffice. Likewise, the Contact Sentence does not suggest that a 
debtor could exercise any § 1692g rights over the phone. And 




what each one conveys. See Wilson, 225 F.3d at 356 (holding 
that a paragraph demanding immediate payment of a debt that 
preceded a Validation Notice did not create “an actual or 
apparent contradiction” with the Validation Notice in violation 
of § 1692g). 
 
* * * 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
